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Abstract—This study is directed towards highlighting tensions 
of incoming and outgoing vendors during outsourcing in a near-
shore context. Incoming-and-outgoing of vendors generate a 
complex form of relationship in which the participating 
organizations cooperate and compete simultaneously. It is of 
great importance to develop knowledge about this kind of 
relationship typically in the current GSE-related multi-sourcing 
environment. We carried out a longitudinal case study and 
utilized data from the ‘Novopay’ project, which is available in 
the public domain. This project involved an outgoing New 
Zealand based vendor and incoming Australian based vendor. 
The results show that the demand for the same human resources, 
dependency upon cooperation and collaboration between 
vendors, reliance on each other system’s configurations and 
utilizing similar strategies by the client, which worked for the 
previous vendor, generated a set of tensions which needed to be 
continuously managed throughout the project.    
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Globalization and advances in telecommunications mean that 
organizations have access to a range of software sourcing 
strategies that can span geographical boundaries, enabling them 
to expand their customer base, employ new resources and work 
more closely with new, previously out-of-reach customers [1]. 
Outsourcing is one such strategy [2] in which a client company 
contracts out part or all of their software development activities 
to an external vendor company [3]. Although outsourcing has 
led to many benefits it has also brought about adverse 
consequences, such as the loss of internal capabilities and skills 
at the hands of vendor organizations [4]. As with all sourcing 
strategies, outsourcing is not inherently good or bad; rather, the 
outcome is determined by how well it is managed before and 
after a contract is signed [5]. While outsourcing has become a 
‘business as usual’ strategy it has been noted that about half of 
such contracts are discontinued either in order to 
switch/transition to a new service provider or to bring the 
previously outsourced activities in house – the latter being 
referred to as Backsourcing [6]. So what happens when such 
contracts are terminated? There is limited research that deals 
with such questions [7]. In this paper we report the results of an 
in-depth longitudinal case study that we carried out to 
understand the process of vendor switching. The study is 
focused around a project in which the main client switched its 
payroll system and associated services from an onshore to a 
near-shore service provider. In this paper we focus in particular 
on the tensions that arose for and between the incoming and 
outgoing vendors, in a context in which the vendors had to 
cooperate and compete at the same time. 
II. CASE INTRODUCTION 
The widely publicized ‘Novopay’ project is an ongoing New 
Zealand-wide transition from an onshore based service provider, 
Datacom, to an Australian based nearshore provider, Talent2. 
The project centered on the Ministry of Education’s (MoE-New 
Zealand) payroll processing system along with its service model, 
which was responsible for the payment of teachers and 
education sector staff. The project involved diverse range of 
stakeholders and included the setting up of a new service model 
following refined business processes. Although, a core function 
in organizations, payroll is rather unforgiving and critical. Even 
minor problems can blowout into significant issues for 
employees and their representatives.  Since its roll-out Novopay 
has faced numerous issues relating to the reliability and accuracy 
of payruns. The inability to address these issues in a timely 
manner has resulted in major sector frustration and a strongly 
negative public perception.  
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. Case Study 
Successful implementation of large scale software and IT-related 
projects are frequently derailed by non-technical challenges due 
to organizational issues, human behavior and poor project 
management [8]. Given the complex context of this research and 
the central role of change over time, a longitudinal case study 
was undertaken, enabling us to focus upon events as they 
unfolded. By following such an approach [9] we were better able 
to gain deeper understanding about why events occurred and the 
threads to be followed. Case study research satisfies a desire to 
understand complex social phenomenon through focus on a 
specific ‘case’ while retaining a holistic and real-world 
perspective [10]. Due to the relevance of the case study 
methodology to understanding a phenomenon in its natural 
setting we chose to use it as the main methodology of this 
research.  
TABLE I.  DATA SOURCES  
 
Internal Reports and Meeting 
Minutes 
Communication 
Memos of Ministry of Education 
(MoE) 
Correspondence between 
representatives of MoE and Exec. of 
the main vendor 
Cabinet Meeting Minutes Correspondence emails of end users 
Status Reports Project Related Documents 
Steering Committee Meeting Minutes Risk Registers 
Payroll Reference Group Meeting 
Minutes  
Project Initiation Doc. 
Novopay Board Meeting Minutes Request For Proposal Doc.- 
including revised versions 
Quarterly Meeting Reports for High 
Risk Projects  
Business Case Doc. 
Periodic Reports of External 
Companies 
Fallback plans and proposals 
 
PwC 
Test Plans and strategies 
Deloitte Communication plans 
Equinox Reports about variations in the 
agreement 
Maven Progress review reports 
IQANZ Surveys carried out from end-users 
Extrinsic Remedial plans and programs  
 
B. Data Management and Analysis 
The availability of documents and reports relating to public 
sector projects may lend opportunities for researchers to utilize 
this empirical evidence to build knowledge, and to provide 
guidelines and archetypes for other similar projects. In 
accordance with the Official Information Act 1982 of New 
Zealand, documents and reports about the high profile and 
troubled Novopay project were released to the public in 2013 - 
we took this as an opportunity and carried out a pilot study [11] 
by analyzing a subset of the data. After receiving positive 
feedback we embarked upon full-scale analysis of all the reports 
and documents.  The results reported here are based upon this 
analysis. The data source files were published on MoE website 
and can be accessed through this web-link: 
www.minedu.govt.nz/theMinistry/NovopayProject.aspx.Table I 
lists these sources. The data analysis process followed an 
iterative strategy. During the first stage of ‘key-point extraction’ 
we analyzed and extracted sections of text if they addressed one 
or more of the following: Actions performed by stakeholders; if 
possible, consequences of those actions taken; issues faced by 
stakeholders; decisions taken by stakeholders; concerns shown 
by stakeholders; Risks and issues considered for the project. 
These criteria were chosen to highlight the candidate key points 
which could be potentially used to extract tensions. 
The extracted key-points were placed in a spreadsheet for 
further analysis. It took more than one year for the first author to 
go through all the documents and extract relevant key-points. 
During the second stage of analysis the previously extracted key-
points were coded in NVivo 10. This stage followed 
complementary cycles of inductive and deductive analyses. The 
coding process was iterative in which the initial codes were 
renamed, merged and/or subdivided into other codes. Throughout 
we ensured that the original ‘chain of data’ was kept with the 
source files. Afterwards, different codes and associated key-
points were merged together in a categorizing phase. These 
categorized themes were then further analyzed to synthesize the 
tensions related to the incoming and outgoing vendor.  
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Resource Dependency 
During the course of transition-related projects there is often a 
possibility to overlap resource requirements between the existing 
and the new vendor which may make the transition process 
difficult to manage. A significant risk in the effective transition 
related to service is how to balance business continuity until 
transition is complete, at the same time build capability of the 
new service centers prior to transition. In the Novopay case, there 
was also a requirement of large overlap in resources between the 
existing Datacom pay centers and the new Talent2 service 
centers. This tension risked both vendors and ultimately the client 
to suffer as a result. Initially, it was expected that a new vendor 
would seek to subcontract services from the existing operators 
and it was considered unlikely that the current sub-contractors 
would obstruct a change in prime vendor. Talent2 was expecting 
to deliver new services by establishing a service center in 
conjunction with Datacom's subcontractors and recruit staff who 
were currently engaged in the current payroll arrangements. Their 
aim was to potentially engage existing employees having relevant 
expertise. As the new service was expected to reduce the head-
count of the service-center staff and this may have resulted in 
revenue reduction for sub-contractors.  
The commercial negotiations and sensitivities complicated 
the planning and those employees were not readily available as 
required by Talent2. This resulted in delays and effected 
relationships between the incoming and outgoing vendor. One of 
the suggestions was to utilize the best portions of Talent2 and 
Datacom business continuity to deliver a Novo-Datapay solution. 
Although it would have been promising for MoE, both the 
vendors independently stated that they would not work with each 
other as partners. Availability of internal personnel resources to 
clarify business requirements are crucial for the timely 
completion of a project. It was well established and documented 
in the project initiation document that the client would ensure the 
availability of such personnel. Following is an excerpt taken from 
the Initiation Document of Novopay: “The Ministry 
acknowledges that in order for the Supplier to meet its 
obligations the Ministry will need to make relevant Ministry 
personnel available in a reasonably timely fashion to answer 
queries from the Supplier on the Ministry’s business 
requirements and those business processes of the Ministry that 
will interface with the Supplier business processes to be 
developed” (Manage Service Delivery Service Schedule, 2008). 
These personnel resources were not readily available when 
required which resulted in delayed sign off of certain 
deliverables.  
B. Contrasting Culture and Lack of Cooperation 
Transition-related projects often require multiple stakeholders 
to collaborate with each other, however, they may have 
contrasting and competing interests. Therefore, it is imperative 
for such projects to have absolute certainty about the vision, 
which should be communicated across all stakeholders. During 
the course of this project there was inefficient flow of 
communication between the project staff and senior leaders.  It 
was not unanimously communicated and agreed if the project 
included a “black-box”, or if it included a service-model as well. 
“The structure of the Novopay project, where each organization 
is responsible for specific deliverables, with limited interaction 
and visibility across the work-streams, has constrained the ability 
of the teams to work collectively to understand the wider 
implications of decisions made during the development of any 
one deliverable. We are aware of multiple opinions across the 
project teams regarding barriers to communication within the 
project and hence a lack of a common understanding of the 
challenges being faced” (Novopay Review Report by Extrinsic, 
Jan 2010).  
This resulted in lack of trust, fatigue, disrespectful behaviors, 
blame, non-delivery, little celebration and a sense of not being 
listened to. Two permanent Subject Matter Experts decided not to 
extend their contracts beyond the current expiry date. They 
expressed concerns about the existence of a ‘blame’ culture, and 
felt under-valued. Concerns were also raised about the 
bureaucratic culture of MoE. “It was noted that there was 
difficulty in getting consistent resources out of the MOE 
[Ministry] communications area. There are too many people 
involved with tasks being moved from one person to the next 
which causes delays in delivery” (Novopay Board meeting 
minutes, Jan2009). Lack of teamness also effected the quality 
assurance activities “The defect management system has not been 
robust, and the true status of deliverables has not been visible to 
all parties. This has all contributed to a “them and us” approach 
that has impeded agreement on quality criteria, a mutual 
understanding of the overall testing process, and what tests are 
required at each step of the process”(Novopay Review Report by 
Extrinsic, Jan 2010). The Ministry and Talent2 also had different 
terminologies related to testing and there were disagreements 
regarding what type of testing is required at which point in time. 
It also indicated an underlying difference in testing philosophy — 
namely merely proving the service worked correctly (a 
requirement for contractual completion) as opposed to 
definitively verifying that the system and service would not fail 
during operational use (a longer-term business requirement for 
the Ministry). This created disagreements between Talent2 and 
Ministry regarding the scope and nature of testing and concerns 
were raised by Talent2 that the current testing approach would 
not permit the delivery of the project on time. 
On the other hand, the Ministry began reviewing a sub-set of 
completed test scripts which were passed by Talent2 to ensure 
the completeness of system testing. This activity revealed that 
these scripts were not auditable because of insufficient detail in 
the desired results. Good testing practice recommends that at a 
minimum the expected results of a test should be recorded with 
the actual results noted. This was not followed in the completed 
test scripts reviewed by the Ministry. The Ministry therefore had 
lost confidence that Talent2 was appropriately testing the system 
C. Data Management Dependency 
Another area of concern during the transition project was the 
management of data, including its conversion from the old to the 
new system. In this project, this activity had key dependencies on 
other activities. It influenced the configuration of the system, 
interfaces, processes, service center training and end-user 
training. Talent2 showed concern that: “they cannot control the 
level of data cleansing and the subsequent unknown impact that 
any remaining dirty data would have on dependent activities 
(such as testing)” (Independent Quality Assurance Summary 
Report, Aug2009).   
The main issue about the data was that it was held in seven 
separate databases having the same reference data but with 
different key identifiers. Each database contained data relating to 
different pay centers and archive storage. Data could be 
transferred from one database to another but this process created 
new records, with new reference numbers. A complete picture of 
a single data set could only be obtained by mapping all multiple 
identifiers together and ‘stitching’ the data together. Complaints 
were made by the new vendor about delayed response from the 
old vendor regarding requests for data, technical information and 
meetings. It was expressed that this may have possible effects on 
downstream work and completion timelines. The old vendor’s 
response on the other hand was “no resources available to 
support this work on a dedicated basis” Novopay Project Status 
Report Weekly, Jan 2012. During the course of this project it was 
found that “data conversion process may lead to errors, 
omissions and/or inaccuracies” (Novopay project risk register-
collated). Although the ownership of erroneous data lay with the 
Ministry and Datacom, Talent 2 did not have the ability to make 
decisions about the correctness of data. However Talent2 was to 
an extent held responsible for managing the resolution of any 
data issues. Datacom’s point of view about the data was that it 
reflected the data provided by the schools so it was up them to 
address with their staff - although, the perception of school-staff 
was that it was a Ministry problem. In order to resolve these data 
related issues, the Ministry and Datacom contacted Schools for 
missing information. This activity identified instances of poor 
human resources practices in schools. To resolve these issues the 
project was tasked to negotiate the collective agreements with 
sector unions — to ensure that the payroll changeover had 
minimal impact on collective agreement negotiations and vice 
versa. This included an extra unplanned activity within the scope 
of the project. The incumbent system had been in operation since 
1996.  
The initial contract was set to expire in 2007, which was 
subsequently extended multiple times till the end of August 2012. 
During the course of this time, the system had been modified to 
fit the Ministry needs to an extent that it became an independent 
product having its own code-base and characteristics. The base 
product was written in an obsolete COBOL language for which 
skilled developers were difficult to find. ‘On-the-fly-add-ons’ 
which were made to enhance the functionality were not 
integrated into the base application and were not written and 
documented robustly enough. This was the situation before the 
transition project began and it was expected that in the Novopay 
change project there would be efficient processes around the 
Change Control Management (CCM) to avoid such a situation 
from happening again. However it was found that, “there is an 
issue that changes are made in TM4 [incumbent system] in the 
pay period prior to go-live without prior warning to the project 
or change control” (Novopay project risk register – collated).  
The ripple effect of these changes were: “problems have been 
identified when testing the ALESCO [new] system against 
converted data. Changes made in data conversion as a result of 
data configurations in the existing Datacom system may require 
changes to the configuration of the ALESCO system. Any such 
configuration changes will require regression testing to ensure 
that there are no unforeseen impacts on the payroll 
functionality” (Novopay Review Report by Extrinsic, Jan 2010). 
Talent2 had a good base product but it lacked the required 
technical ability to customize and deploy their product according 
to the Ministry’s needs.  
D. Contractual Arrangements With a New Vendor 
The initiation of a new client-vendor relationship should be 
progressive and evolutionary, especially, in a case where the 
client previously established a trust-based ‘Network’-like 
relationship with the old vendor. Expecting similar arrangements 
with a new vendor from the beginning may result in unexpected 
outcomes. Mirani in [12] argued that client-vendor relationships 
typically begins with a ‘Contract’-based relationship in which 
simple applications are contracted out to the vendors. Over time 
more complex applications are assigned to selected vendors, 
which may demand an establishment of a trust-based ‘Network’-
like relationship. The initial approach taken in the Novopay 
project was to backsource the overall management to MoE and 
utilize services of multiple vendors. Subsequently, MoE re-
evaluated its requirements and switched to a Business Process 
Outsourcing (BPO) based contract. A single prime vendor was 
chosen to manage the whole service and operation. In order to 
manage this BPO agreement, contracts were constructed to 
provide strong incentives for the quality of service to be 
achieved. The contract would thus considered to be the key 
means for deliverables. However, it may be argued that 
management of a large-scale transition-based BPO project 
through a new vendor is not a feasible policy.  
Following are sample excerpts to elaborate this:“[Ministry] 
acknowledge[s] that T2 has found it more difficult and more 
expensive to deliver on its contract commitments than it 
originally estimated, but this doesn't mean the Ministry must 
accept a higher price or reduced scope” (Executive 
correspondence, letter from  Ministry to Talent2, 
May2011).“[MoE] understand your team has suggested that, if 
the Ministry [MoE] is not willing to provide the additional 
funding, the project will need to be de-scoped. It is not clear to 
me why the Ministry would agree to this, given that T2 has been 
contracted to deliver the existing project scope for an agreed 
fixed price” (Executive correspondence, letter from Ministry to 
Talent2, May2011). 
E. Refining Business Processes 
Switching of vendors and/or system-transition may provide 
an opportunity and temptation for the client to improve and 
standardize their internal business processes. This was the case in 
Novopay project as well which included changing of systems, 
switching of vendors, and service-model and refinement of 
business processes – all together in a single project. Introduction 
of such changes should be phased-in incrementally, so as to cause 
minimal disruption. Otherwise, as we found out from this case, 
the end-users may find it difficult and conflicting to manage with 
ease.  
In the Novopay project, previously, the end-users had a 
dedicated pay clerk who understood the represented schools’ 
situation and was their specific contact person. The newer 
service-model did not provide such customized, hands-on and 
highly personalized service. The previous vendor also helped 
end-users on one-to-one based relationships and further provided 
advice, guidance, interpretation and in some cases HR advice. In 
the new service model, this knowledge was built up at the end-
users side. The main purpose of this fundamental change was to 
create consistency and standardization between end-users 
regarding collective agreement interpretations, rules and policies. 
For this to have worked new competencies, new technologies, 
new processes and new behaviors were to be developed. The 
underlying complexity and magnitude of the scale was not well 
understood and online-training was considered as an efficient 
method to prepare for this change. End-users were provided with 
direct access to their information which was expected to 
empower them, resulting in better service. Errors relating to data-
input were prevented through validation routines implemented 
inside the software. However, enforcing automated-rules in the 
system and adding extra responsibilities to end-users resulted in 
resistance.  They felt threatened, uncomfortable, concerned and 
emotional about these impositions.  
Following is an excerpt taken from a Survey   “The Beta has 
errors, does not show allowances for staff - has fields to fill in 
that are new and we do not understand what they mean - you 
cannot run a report to check what you have entered into the 
system before posting and validating the info. I feel that as a user 
the beta is unreliable - as every time I enter data into the system - 
it shows up errors” (Novopay Change Readiness and 
Engagement Survey, Aug2012). 
In hind-sight we argue that refinement of business processes 
and end-user awareness of transition should be treated 
separately, but related projects, with careful consideration 
towards addressing end-user concerns within a wider change 
program. 
F. Single-Phase Rollout 
A transition-project of this scale should be tested initially 
with smaller subsets of data to increase the confidence of end-
users. The initial strategy of Novopay was to rollout the project 
in two phases. Initially South Island followed up by North Island 
after three months. During the course of time major concerns and 
risks were raised. At the South Island cutover, Datacom would 
still be processing the North Island payroll. Before the North 
Island cutover, its data would need to be converted from the 
Datacom system and integrated with the South Island data in the 
Novopay. Talent2 would then operate the North and South Island 
data using the Novopay system and the Datacom system would 
be decommissioned. However, it was noted that North Island 
data in the three month interim period may introduce further 
system or configuration changes. These changes would not have 
been applied to the “live” South Island data, so any integration of 
the two data sets had the potential to introduce further errors.  
This type of staggered implementation was expected to add 
further complexity. Moreover, a pilot project involving 30 
schools was also cancelled and replaced by a Beta Environment 
to be used while training end-users. Concerns were shown about: 
“Staff work at multiple schools and receive a single payslip. If a 
pilot occurs at a selection of schools [then it] need to manage the 
staff moving between the pilot and other payroll. Very complex to 
manage moving staff between payrolls and still providing single 
payslip” (Novopay Project Briefing, Nov2012). Contrasting with 
a view that “This big bang approach is a recipe of failure”[13]. 
Faults and errors are less costly to be found and fixed in the 
earlier stages than in the latter stages[14]. In this project, certain 
validation activities were pushed to the latter stages and 
eventually squeezed further to fit the time constraints. 
TABLE II.  SOURCES OF TENSIONS IN A TRANSITION PROJECT 
Balancing the ongoing service and operations with a new setup during the 
interim-period 
Dependency and reliance of human resources between the incoming and 
outgoing vendors 
Dependency upon the old vendor to help interpret data stored in their 
system 
Failure to negotiate with the third party contractors to support the new setup 
 
Changes made to the old system, during the interim-period, resulted in data 
inconsistencies in the new system 
Bureaucratic culture at MoE resulted in delays for the new vendor 
 
Different terminologies causing confusion and delays 
 
Management of a large-scale and complex project through a contract 
 
Aiming to refine processes during switching of vendors and software system 
 
Single phase roll out strategy due to complexity associated with phased 
transition 
 
V. VALIDITY THREATS 
In this research, we relied upon the secondary data which was 
not gathered for the purpose of carrying out this empirical 
research. We had no control over this process and this can be 
considered as a validity threat. However, we used multiple 
sources of information as mentioned in TABLE I to cover the 
viewpoints of different stakeholders. This reduced biasness 
towards specific stakeholder groups and provided triangulation 
and saturation of themes. Furthermore, other researchers have 
considered secondary data to be more objective than perception-
based data collected through Interviews or Surveys [15]. 
Qualitative studies are often criticized for the perceived 
difficulties in replicating them since identical circumstances may 
not be recreated [16].  
The significance of using secondary data is that it is easily 
reproducible which enable other researchers to extend the 
original work [15] or possibly replicate the study independently. 
Although most of the analysis was done by the main researcher, a 
considerable amount of time was spent during this exercise. 
Regular meetings were held with the other two senior researchers 
from time to time to discuss the emerging themes and take 
feedback upon them. In order to understand the relevance of this 
data, we carried out a pilot study [11] in early 2013.It was based 
upon a subset of data which provided us confidence in the 
relevance of this data to describe the phenomenon of transition. 
To follow this up, we embarked upon a full-scale longitudinal 
case study. Government agencies and Ministries are often 
involved in software-related transition projects and, although, we 
don’t claim that the results of this study would be widely 
generalizable but it will provide insights and rich description 
about the transition phenomenon which, if interpreted with 
caution, provide new avenues of risk-management in such 
projects. Interestingly, Queensland (Australia) Health, Payroll 
Transition Project demonstrates surprising similarities with 
Novopay – some of them are listed in [17]  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Change is multifaceted and understanding such a complex 
phenomenon requires appreciation of conflicting realities, 
objectives and behaviors [18].  In this study we investigated the 
tensions of the transition process. Tensions are the outcomes of 
multiple, often competing, conditions which complicate the 
decision making. The implications of this research are that as 
outsourcing continues, switching from one vendor to another is 
also becoming common, and it is therefore important that 
organizations develop their readiness-models, based upon 
tensions, to cope with them. Traditional theory construction 
methodologies could lead to the development of theories which 
might be internally consistent but are of limited scope, which 
puts relatively little attention on the opportunities offered by 
deeper analysis of tensions and contradictions [19]. We used an 
alternative approach to theory building which was to look for 
tensions or oppositions and use them afterwards to build more 
encompassing theories.  
Moreover, the results derived through a private organization’s 
context may not scale and generalize to public sector projects due 
to differences in culture, policies, environments, governance 
structures etc. This warrants the creation of parallel body of 
knowledge related to public sector projects and in doing so the 
results will be reported with greater rigor. Finally, we 
demonstrated the value of publicly available secondary data 
sources for carrying out longitudinal studies. Results, from the 
vendors’ side, show that during the interim period the incoming 
and going vendors have to cooperate and compete at the same 
time. The former was reliant upon the latter to help interpret data, 
system configurations and transfer of human resources. From the 
client side, they took vendor-transition as an opportunity to make 
further changes in their policies and approach – they chose a 
contract-based relationship, enhanced business processes and 
went for a big-bang approach to roll out the project. We have 
presented research work in progress and in the future we intend 
to build upon these results and include a wider set of tensions and 
their association with each other. In doing so we shall follow a 
‘process based’ [20] research model and focus upon sequences of 
events to explain how and why particular outcomes were 
reached. 
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